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To the dismay of the Peruvian government and military officers, in recent years the Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas have successfully spread out from their Andean mountain
stronghold and are emerging as a growing urban political force. Estimates of guerrilla numbers
remain at less than 5,000 combatants. However, a recent poll in Lima indicated that 15% of
respondents believed the movement would eventually seize power, compared with just 4% a year
ago. The Sendero Luminoso and the country's severe economic problems currently dominate
political debate. Politicians and citizens are concerned with how to deal with the movement. The
government bears the brunt of criticism from all sides for its perceived failure in dealing with the
guerrillas. Some political analysts argue that sympathy for the rebels and their cause has increased
alongside discontent enhanced by prolonged economic recession. The recent capture of Osman
Morote believed to be a top Sendero Luminoso military chief was first received as a stunning blow
to the movement. His court appearance became a platform for the guerrillas to expound their views.
[On July 20, a Lima tribunal dismissed the government's case against Morote on charges of terrorism
for lack of evidence. See article below.] The government's defensive position on the guerrilla
problem is the result of repeated massacres of innocent Indian peasants while rebel losses in these
incidents were negligible. In the most recent such case, witnesses say that on May 14 soldiers killed
about 30 villagers at Cayara, Ayacucho department. The massacre was reportedly engineered as
a reprisal for a rebel attack on an army convoy. In that incident on May 13, four soldiers died. The
government has apparently denied witnesses' accounts to avoid an open confrontation with the
military. Since President Alan Garcia was inaugurated nearly three years, academics and politicians
have counted 11,182 dead in guerrilla operations, clashes between rebels and the military or police,
and, military retaliatory operations. Civilians, mainly Indian peasants, and rebels make up the lion's
share of the dead. Sendero Luminoso is considered to be a symptom of a long-standing process of
social conflict evidenced in part by the mass migration of Indian peasants from destitute Andean
communities to the sprawling slums of Lima and other coastal cities. As a result of impoverishment
of the rural population, migration began in the 1950s. However, the depopulation of the sierra was
accelerated in the 1970s by an ill-fated government land distribution program and in the 1980s by
guerrilla violence and military repression. The rebels say they represent the vast majority of Indians
and people of mixed descent. The rapid growth of the movement after beginning armed actions in
May 1980 indicated that more was involved than simply an odd messianic terrorist organization.
Sendero Luminoso was founded by Abimael Guzman, a marxist philosophy professor. In the
1970s, his followers at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho worked for several years among
nearby Indian mountain communities before launching its Maoist campaign to "strangle" the cities.
Shining Path made its mark through grotesque methods to "convince" peasants into supporting
the movement and to punish those who refused. Many leftists say the movement more closely
resembles the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot in Cambodia than Mao's Chinese revolutionaries. Since
1984 Sendero Luminoso has made appearances in southern departments such as Cuzco, Puno,
Pasco, Apurimac, Huancavelica, and Huancayo. Guerrillas have also worked to enhance discontent
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among coca growers of the Upper Huallaga Valley who were irritated by government anti-drug
campaigns. The most dramatic shift in the guerrillas' strategy, however, was its move to Lima. Of
the capital city's over 6 million residents, at least one-third are slumdwellers. Sendero Luminoso's
impact in Lima is reportedly most obvious in the University of San Marcos, attended mainly by poor
students of peasant extraction, and in several trade unions involved in long-running wage disputes
and strikes. The movement has also established numerous front organizations. Included are the
Association of Democratic Lawyers, whose members have defended arrested rebels; Popular Aid, an
organization providing assistance to imprisoned guerrillas; the Committee of Families of Prisoners
of War and Political Prisoners, which organizes public protests; the Association of New Culture,
which promotes cultural events; the Class Committee of Unions of the Central Highway, and the
Movement of Class Laborers and Workers. The newspaper El Diario, founded by orthodox leftists
in 1980, was taken over by Sendero Luminoso two years ago. In 1983, the conservative government
of President Fernando Belaunde Terry reacted to the new security threat in a predictable fashion
with a series of murders of suspected peasant collaborators. The government managed to alienate
much of the Indian population in Ayacucho. In 1985, Garcia entered the presidency promising a
different approach to the rebel problem. Acknowledging the social causes of the movement, Garcia
pledged large new investments for the Andean regions, as well as an end to human rights abuses by
the armed forces. Unfortunately, Garcia's efforts have thus far failed. Shortly after his inauguration,
army troops carried out several killings. The president ordered investigations, and the military
responded by suspension of certain patrolling activities, enabling the rebels to return to areas they
had previously abandoned. In June 1986, troops killed morethan 250 guerrillas who mutinied in
three Lima prisons. After Garcia pledged punishment for those responsible, military officers let
it be known that they considered counter- insurgency no longer their job, but rather that of the
police. The president's credibility in the eyes of military leaders has declined, although in practice
no military officer has been punished for human rights abuses since 1985. Moreover, public opinion
has it that he is either unable or unwilling to control repression. The other prong of Garcia's strategy
to meet the rebel challenge spending in the highlands has also been less than effective. Some of the
problems here include the national government bureaucracy's apparent reluctance to give priority
to the highlands; scarce resources, further reduced by economic crisis and inflation; and, in the case
of Ayacucho, local officials have embezzled millions of dollars destined for outlying communities.
In early July, Garcia was caught in a controversy after he was quoted by a local newspaper as
having expressed his admiration for the idealism of Sendero Luminoso, although he condemned its
extremist methods. Meanwhile, he government was reported to be considering declaring a state of
"internal warfare" as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy. In an address to the nation June 27,
newly appointed Prime Minister Armando Villanueva called on all political parties to help develop
a new counter-insurgency strategy. Consensus among parties has not yet emerged. (Basic data from
New York Times, 07/17/88; Prensa Latina, 07/25/88)
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